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Abstract  
This paper will document financial aspects of transactions, and trade credit supply 
behavior with FDI among small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) based on two 
original surveys, conducted in four cities in China in 2003. The survey was designed to 
capture the nature of inter-firm transactions, trade credit and other financial 
conditions. Literature on FDI mainly refers to technology transfer, employment or 
investment. This paper focuses on the role and significance of FDI in the supply of 
trade credit due to its trade credit enforcement technology.  
Yanagawa, Ito and Watanabe [2006] developed a model which indicates that when a seller 
has higher enforcement technology or a buyer has richer liquidity, both trade credit and transaction 
volume will be increased. In this paper, we confirmed that FDI and G contributed to the provision 
of trade credit and had a positive external effect on trade credit enforcement towards China’s 
economy. (1) Sales towards FDI customers have the power to increase the trade credit ratio,  
even when controlling other factors such as choice of payment instrument, competitiveness, and ex 
post default management. This implies that FDI does provide trade credit, not only because it has 
superior liquidity, but because it is also superior in terms of enforcement of trade credit repayment. 
(2) Cash constraints of the buyer influence the decisions concerning  trade credit provided by the 
seller, as a model in Yanagawa, et al. [2006] predicted, and this implies that strategic default is a 
serious concern among SMEs in China. (3) Spillover effect exists in payment enforcement 
technology in transactions with FDI customers.  
 
Keywords: incomplete contract, trade credit, spillover of technology, FDI, 
government-owned firms 
JEL classification: O5, K0, G2, P31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental, 
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute 
merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.  
The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and 
related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).  Publication does 
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views 
expressed within. 
 
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO 
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI 
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN 
 
©2007 by Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO 
 1
1. Introduction and problem setting 
The role of FDI in the host country’s economy is mainly argued with reference to 
technology transfers in terms of production, management, and so on. This paper will 
focus on other aspects: how transactions with FDI will contribute to the financial 
condition of domestics firms; credit on transactions, and risk-sharing on transactions. 
All inter-firm transactions have financial aspects by nature. Financial function refers 
here to the provisions of (a) credit or financial resources, (b) payment/settlement 
function and instruments, (c) risk management, and (d) incentive control. The supply of 
goods or services from supplier to buyer accompanies payment in the opposite direction. 
This payment contract often generates a provision of credit or risk-sharing when the 
supply of goods and the payment has a time difference. Further, payment contracts may 
also be provided with incentive mechanisms, e.g. linkage between quality assessment 
and payment.   
 These financial functions are substantially subject to institutions, not only in 
the developed economies, but particularly in developing economies or transitional 
economies. The institutions referred to here are legal institutions such as civil law, 
company law, security law and courts, and other enforcement entities who implement 
decisions by the court. China is an good example to observe and understand how the 
institutions affect financial aspects of inter-firm transactions, because the legal 
institution for firms operating in China can be distinguished by ownership type, roughly 
speaking, as publicly owned firms (state-owned firms and collective-owned firms), 
private firms and foreign-owned firms (FDI). In practice, firms operating in China have 
complained of vicious late payment practices, called triangle debt in Chinese, and these 
have been on the policy agenda since the late 1980s and up to the present.  
 In China, where numerous FDI firms are operating, what is their contribution 
to the Chinese economy? Usually, it is in the spillover of technology. However, this paper 
will focus on the financial aspects of FDI contribution, particularly the flow of financial 
resources via trade credit. FDI enhances trade credit volume in China via this channel, 
and contributes to the improvement of the financial environment of the Chinese 
economy. The first contribution of this paper is to document this point, i.e., that FDI 
provides more trade credit for the Chinese economy, based on data. 
Why then does FDI have a positive effect on the increase of trade credit? 
Theoretically, two hypotheses are in contest. The first one claims that FDI can provide 
larger trade credit due to abundant cash and liquidity. The other claims that FDI has a 
more effective technology with which to prevent or manage the strategic default of a 
buyer, and thus can provide larger liquidity. This paper will show that the latter 
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argument is more consistent with data. This is the second contribution of this paper. 
 
2. Analytical framework 
 
2.1 Theoretical model 
Yanagawa, Ito and Watanabe [2006] developed a model of trade credit provision under 
an environment where contract enforcement is imperfect. A rough description of the 
model is as follows: We have one buyer and one seller, who will make a contract on the 
transaction of goods. The goods X are traded at price P, the buyer will make a payment T, 
out of the total of PX when the goods are delivered from the seller. The buyer will 
benefit V(X)=vX by trading this product, and the cost function of the seller is C(X)=cX. 
Trade volume X will be endogenously determined in the negotiation process between 
buyer and seller. We also assume that v and c are exogenously given and that v>c. 
 At date 1, buyer and seller agree to trade the product and specify the payment 
schedule. In order to deliver the products at date 1, the seller incurs the cost of 
production cX. The goods X are traded at price P, the buyer will make a cash on delivery 
payment T, out of the total of PX, when the goods are delivered from the seller. The 
residual PX-T is the volume of trade credit from the seller to the buyer1. When the 
enforcement of this trade credit contract is imperfect, the buyer has an incentive not to 
pay (PX-T). 
To formulate the strategic default incentive by the buyer, we assume that the 
seller can seize only a part of the buyer’s benefit, svX, when the default occurs. We call s 
the enforcement technology of the seller and we assume s<1.  Here, the buyer, or the 
receiver of trade credit, does not have to repay (1-s)vX. Under this situation, the 
contracted price P is almost meaningless, because regardless of the contracted price P, 
both parties may expect that the buyer will default and the seller will receive only svX.  
Hence, the seller can expect to receive,    
  Min[PX-T, svX].  
We also assume the buyer will have 100% bargaining power, and also has a cash 
amount of A. The buyer will solve the following problem, 
                                                  
1 Theoretically, trade credit might be given from the buyer to the seller in the form of 
prepayment, but this is recognized as marginal in practice, and our survey also 
confirmed this point. 
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       Max  A+vX-T-Min[PX-T, svX] 
        s.t.  T+Min[PX-T, svX]>_cX : Individual rationality condition of the seller 
                                 A>T.    : Cash constraint of the buyer 
 
 By solving this problem, we obtain the following results; 
Proposition 1.  As long as c>sv holds, the equilibrium transaction volume contracted 
price, cash on delivery payment and trade credit become; 
                  X*= A/(c-sv) 
     P*>= c 
                  T*=A 
    P*X*-T*= svA/(c-sv)  
Proposition 2 The equilibrium trade volume X* and trade credit P*X*-T* are an 
increasing function of the cash held by the buyer, A and the enforcement technology of 
the seller, s. 
 
This result implies that enforcement mechanisms or the enforcement 
technology of the seller is important for trade volume, and hence the profit of the buyer 
(not only that of the seller, whose technology level affects trade and credit volumes). 
When a firm buys goods from the supplier and will later sell their products to the 
customer, the transaction between the firm and the supplier may affect the transaction 
between the firm and the customer, or vice versa. The model in Yanagawa, et al. [2006] 
shows that A will affect others through changes in trade volume and cash in hand. 
 
Proposition 3: The equilibrium trade volume and trade credit from the supplier to the 
firm are an increasing function of the enforcement technology of the surveyed 
(customer) firm2. Enforcement technology has an external effect which enhances both 
trade and trade credit volumes.  
  
                                                  
2 See proof and detailed structure of the model in Yanagawa, et al. [2006]. 
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2.2 Empirical questions and problems in empirical application 
 
In Yanagawa, et al. [2006], we placed the government-owned firms in the middle of a 
transaction chain, and confirmed that the government-owned firms have a positive  
effect on payment enforcement, based on the survey data obtained at Yibin City, 
Sichuan Province (see IDE-DRC Survey below), where actually no FDI were operating. 
This paper will take the firm between supplier and customer as the FDI firm. If the FDI 
has a high enforcement technology for payment, it may increase transaction credit and 
transactions in the host country. If the enforcement technology of payment enforcement 
has an external effect, and enhances trade volume and trade credit, the FDI may play a 
very important role in the financial aspect. This financial function also needs to be 
recognized as a positive role of FDI.   
 Applying the propositions in the model analysis above to this empirical 
motivation, our empirical questions here are as follows; 
Q.1  Does a transaction with FDI provide credit to domestic firms? Is it bigger than 
that provided by other ownership type firms? 
Q.2  Does FDI have better enforcement technology compared to domestic firms? 
Q.3 Does a transaction with FDI generate a larger transaction volume due to a trade 
credit/enforcement technology factor. 
Q.4 Does FDI enforcement technology have a positive external effect on trade credit 
enforcement? 
  
In the theoretical model, the cash in hand of the buyer, A, and enforcement technology 
of the seller, s, are the exogenous variables which determine trade volume X and trade 
credit volumes PX-T. The model depicts how cash constraint affects trade credit 
provision, as well as the enforcement technology. In this paper, we are interested in the 
role of FDI in payment contract enforcement and trade credit provision. Thus, our main 
concern in this paper is with the impact of enforcement technologies on trade credit 
provisions3.  
Regarding empirical application, the problem is how to capture the level of 
                                                  
3 For cash in hand, A, it is also not easy to tell which variable should be selected. For 
example, first we have to choose cash assets on the asset liability table or cash flow. 
Among cash flows, we have information on net cash flow in or gross cash flow, or cash 
flow in sales, or cash flow from financial activities that might be related to loans from 
banks or other external parties. The PBOC-JICA survey contains information on firms’ 
transactions with banks and on bank information. Detailed tests on cash constraints 
will be possible.  
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enforcement technology. We are only able to obtain proxy information. Enforcement 
technology can be recognized as a composite of several factors; (a) payment instruments 
offered by financial institutions, (b) administrative and legal institutions regarding the 
enforcement of contracts, (c) competitiveness of the firms, and (d) firm’s skill or 
experience of contract enforcement. In our survey, we have related information, but we 
do not know how these factors comprise enforcement technology. The enforcement 
technology might be a simple linear combination of the factors above, or may have a 
specific functional form, but we do not have information to distinguish these here. 
Therefore, we will assume that enforcement technology is a linear combination of all the 
related information that might be connected to enforcement technology, then test which 
factors contribute to an enhancement of trade credit supply. 
   
2.3 Institutions  
Next, we need to see how institutional factors or institutions may affect the enforcement 
of payment schedules of trading contracts, or the buyer’s incentive to default.  
 
(a) Ownership 
 In China, corporate activities have been regulated according to ownership type: 
until corporate law became effective in 1993, state-owned enterprises were established 
based on the “State Owned Enterprise Law” enacted in 1988, town and village 
enterprises were established under the “Town and Village Enterprises Accounting Rule” 
introduced in 1986 or the “Town and Village Enterprises Law” enacted in 1996.  
Private enterprises are governed by their regulations and Foreign Direct Investment 
Enterprises are regulated under the Foreign Direct Investment Law and related 
regulations respectively. Even after the Corporate Law came into force, individual firms 
were regulated under their respective legal grounds until they were transferred to the 
company under the corporate law. Each law provides target category firms with clauses 
on financing, profit distribution and accounting rules. Among these laws and 
regulations, there were no unified rules or principles. On the other hand, although the 
legal systems are very complicated, there remains substantial ambiguity within which 
companies may operate. These defects of the laws and regulations were alleviated by 
administrative action.    
 Regarding contract enforcement, institutions influential on trade credit and 
other financial demands and supplies, are presumably different from each other 
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according to ownership type. At least until re-entry into WTO, FDI company regulations 
were distinct from domestic company regulations. Domestic companies also differ from 
each other by coming under different legal regulations; publicly owned firms and 
private firms. Therefore, when we take a look into the nature of transactions with SMEs 
in China, it would be reasonable to classify the SMEs in our survey into three groups by 
ownership type: the first is FDI, the second is the publicly owned enterprise, which 
includes state-owned and collective-owned enterprises (town and village enterprises) 
(G), and thirdly, privately owned enterprises (P).   
 
(b) Payment instruments 
 When thinking about payment enforcement, the selection of payment 
instruments is important, and the functions that each instrument plays are subject to 
the institutions of the home economy.  In our survey, the surveyed firms were asked to 
describe the share of following six payment instruments; (1) cash, (2) cheques, (3) bank 
notes (4) bank drafts, (5) commercial drafts and (6) credit card. (1) cash is an instrument 
the seller prefers most and does not allow for any trade credit. (2) A cheque is an 
instrument whereby banks will guarantee the payment up to the cash amount in the 
bank account of the buyer. (3) A bank note is a payment instrument offered by banks, 
usually for payment between remote areas. Local banks for each home city will 
guarantee the settlement within the amount of the buyer’s account. For cheques and 
bank notes, the bank will be responsible for payment as long as the buyer’s account 
holds sufficient cash. For (4) bank drafts, the bank will take a further risk in China. 
When the buyer makes a payment by bank draft, the bank will guarantee the whole 
amount of the payment, regardless of the liquidity of the buyer. In the market economy, 
a draft is issued based on the credit of the issuer, or buyer firms, and it is rare that a 
draft is issued based on the credit of banks for issuer firms. In China, (5) a commercial 
draft corresponds to a draft in the market economy. Since the reform and transition to a 
market economy began in China, strategic default by buyer firms has been so prevalent 
that it has become very difficult to issue a draft based only on the credit of firms. The 
bank draft is a unique institutional arrangement that was introduced in order to 
conquer the problem of strategic default by the issuers of drafts. (6) The credit card is a 
payment instrument whereby a card-issuing company will provide short-term credit for 
payment.  
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3. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
3.1 Data 
The data we have collected consists of two surveys: one was conducted at Yibin City, 
Sichuan Province, in January 2003, which was conducted by the Development Research 
Center and the Institute of Developing Economies (hereafter called the DRC-IDE 
Survey). The other was conducted by the People’s Bank of China and commissioned by 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency, at Beijing City; Dongguan City, 
Guangdong Province; and Xi’an City, Xianxi Province in December 2000 (hereafter 
called the PBOC-JICA Survey). The two surveys were implemented using a very 
similarly structured questionnaire in the section concerning inter-firm transactions, 
and thus we have been able to pool the two surveys here to analyze firms’ behavior 
regarding trade credit. 
 
<Figure 1 Map of survey sites> 
 
  The survey consists of 465 private enterprises, 124 government enterprises and 
49 FDI firms; 638 firms in total (Table 1). Beijing has largest number, 26, of FDI 
companies, but Yibin, whose data are utilized in Yangawa et al. [2006] to document the 
positive role of government-owned firms, has no FDI among the surveyed firms.  
 
< Table 1  Distributions of location and ownership of surveyed firms> 
 
The survey was designed to ask the surveyed firm for information on transactions with 
(1) customer firms located inside the home city of the surveyed firms, (b) customer firms 
located outside the home city, (3) suppliers located in the home city, and (4) suppliers 
outside the home city (Figure 2). Target transaction partners were selected on the 
principle of being the largest company to have active transactions with the surveyed 
firm at the time of implementation of the survey. The distinction of the city border was 
motivated by the wish to capture the influences of administrative action or enforcement, 
when legal enforcement in China is often criticized as being too weak.  
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<Figure 2  Information structure of the survey> 
 
 
3.2 Profiles of Transactions with FDI: Descriptive statistics 
 
3.2.1 Trade credit and Transaction volume 
We are interested in what factor affects trade credit supply, and furthermore, 
transaction volume. Firstly, we take a look at what actually happens with two 
endogenous variables in the model, trade credit (Table 2) and transaction volumes 
(Table 3). Concerning the size of trade credit, other than accounts receivable or payables 
on asset liability tables, we surveyed the ratios of (1) payment after delivery, (2) cash on 
delivery, and (3) prepayment, where the sum of these three factors is supposed to be 100 
per cent. As we found that the size of (3) prepayment is marginal, here we do not 
consider net trade credit to be ( (1) – (3) ), but take the gross share of (1) payment after 
delivery ratio as a ratio of trade credit, (PX-T)/X in the model description, and (2) cash 
on delivery as T, payment at date 1 in the model.  
 Table 2 shows ratios of trade credit in sales (credit is given by the surveyed 
firm to the customers), and trade credit in procurement (credit is received by the 
surveyed firms from the suppliers). In customer-surveyed firms’ transactions, trade 
credit ratios towards FDI or Government-owned firms are all beyond 70 per cent in 
terms of median, and particularly from FDI sellers to FDI or Government-owned 
customers these are as high as 90 per cent. On the contrary, when a private firm is a 
receiver of a trade credit contract, all ownership types become conservative, and provide 
the least share among the three types of ownership. As a supplier of credit, private 
firms seem to be conservative in that they provided the least share at each category. In 
surveyed firm-supplier transactions, we found a similar tendency, though it was less 
apparent.  
 
<Table 2 Ratio of payment after delivery in a transaction> 
 
Concerning transaction volume, although variances are much larger than with the 
trade credit ratio, we can see that transactions from FDI to all ownership types are 
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larger than from other types in terms of median. As a receiver of credit, FDI and 
government-owned firms are more or less the same in transaction volume. Similarly to 
trade credit ratio, privately owned firms trades are no larger than others as both 
receiver and supplier of the credit. The descriptive data implies that FDI and 
government- owned firms contribute to China’s economy as active providers of trade 
credit and enhancer of economic size.   
 
<Table 3 Transaction volume by ownership type> 
 
3.2.2  Proxies of enforcement technology 
How, then, are the factors related to enforcement technology or cash in hand? In our 
survey, the following information was available; ownership types of trading partners, 
structure of payment instruments, geographical or administrative area information 
such as addresses of trading partners, and shares of sales according to market sites, i.e., 
home city and exports. Competitive conditions and experiences of default in trade credit 
and ex post management to the default incident were surveyed as well. Here we take a 
look at the nature of firms by ownership type between trading partners. 
  
(a) Payment instruments 
Choice of payment instruments is important in managing default risk by the buyer. 
Table 4 documents the share of payment instruments for each transaction between 
customers and surveyed firms. Here, we can find a distinction by ownership type. 
Among the six instruments, the cheque is the major instrument in terms of both median 
and mean. The second most frequently used instrument is cash. It is interesting that 
FDI and private firms prefer cash as a buyer, but on the contrary government-owned 
firms seem to prefer to receive cheques.  Bank notes follow the top two, and the bank 
draft is in fourth place (Appendix 1).    
 
(b) Geographical/administrative factors  
Arrangement for payment enforcement depends on where customers are located; the 
availability of payment instruments will change. For example, the bank note is offered 
when settling payment between remote sites, cheques were originally introduced to 
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settle local payments. In addition, the availability of information on customers, 
institutional arrangements to manage ex post when a default occurs may depend on 
geographical or administrative distribution. Tables in Appendix 2 show shares of sales 
in export and home city of surveyed firms, classified by pairs of customer’s ownership 
type – surveyed firm’s ownership type. For export, FDI sellers, particularly FDI-FDI 
pairs, show a far higher share than other ownership types. On the contrary, more than 
half of total sales of G sellers are to the home city market, higher than other ownership 
types. Ownership types of buyers do not show systematic differences (Appendix 2 
Marketing area). 
 
(c) Competition 
To measure the level of competitive factors and bargaining power, the following 
information was surveyed: (1) uniqueness of the product sold to the customer (if the 
products is unique =1, if it is a commodity =0), (2) the number of rival firms, in 
transactions with the customer (This question is surveyed for an answer in count data. 
If no competitors=0, few competitors=1, several competitors=2, numerous 
competitors=3).  (3) Share of products purchased among total inputs, (4) whether they 
have potential suppliers other than the current transaction partner (If yes=1, no=0).  
For uniqueness of goods, around 60 per cent of transactions with FDI 
customers trade unique goods from the current supplier, those with private firms trade 
as low as 20 to 40 per cent, those with Government-owned firms traded at a middle level 
of around 40 to 50 per cent (Appendix 3 Competitiveness and bargaining power).  
 
(d) Default experience and its management 
To see how the firms managed default incidents, we set the following questions: (1) 
From 1999 to 2003, were you faced with default by the buyer? (This questioned required 
a choice of 1 out of the following 3 situations, 1. No default (yes=1, no=0), 2. Delayed 
payment that was eventually paid in full (yes=0, no=1), 3. Complete default (yes=1, 
no=0). 
   For cases where the FDI supplier sold products to FDI and private customers, 
higher shares of surveyed firms answered that they have not been defaulted (FDI 
customer-FDI surveyed firms answered 0.61 per cent in mean, FDI customer-private 
surveyed firms answered 0.51 per cent). On the contrary, these two categories of firms 
answered lowest to the question whether or not they have been completely defaulted. 
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For ex post management to a default incident, we cannot see any systematic differences 
by ownership types in these descriptive statistics (Appendix 4 Default experience and ex 
post management).    
 
 
4. Estimation 
4.1 Estimation Strategy  
The model in the previous section shows that, under an environment where strategic 
default by the buyer may occur, and this is very probable in the case of China, amounts 
of trade credit and cash on delivery, and transaction volumes in equilibrium are 
determined as follows: 
 
  Trade credit function;                P*X*-T*= svA/(c-sv)  ,  
Transaction volume function;         X*= A/(c-sv)         .  
          Ratio of trade credit in a transaction;  (P*X*-T*)/X* = sv 
           
It is deduced that volume variables are an increasing function of A, cash in hand of the 
buyer, and s, enforcement technology of the seller, and that the ratio of trade credit is a 
function of s, enforcement technology. 
 
(a) Fractional logit and exponential regression 
 Data available for dependent variables are (a) ratio of payment after delivery, 
(b) transaction volume with four specific transaction partners (customer in home city, 
customer outside home city, supplier in home city, and supplier outside home city), and 
(c) binary dummy relating to not experiencing default, or being completely defaulted.  
In the first case, the ratio is a fractional variable distributed in [0, 1]. Our data 
often take the boundary values 0 or 1. In this case, fractional logit regression is 
proposed by Papke and Wooldridge [1996]. First we assume that conditional expectation 
follows logistic functions; 
 E(y|x) = exp(xβ)/[1+exp(xβ)] =G(xβ)   
This modeling allows us to predict values for y in (0, 1).  Just as with the 
binary logit model, the derivative of conditional expectation on xj is βj g(xβ)(g(x
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β)=G’(xβ)). Here, we can take this model to be a quasi maximum likelihood function as 
a binary response model following a logistic cdf function,  
l i(β)= yi  log[exp(xβ)/[1+exp(xβ)]]+ (1-yi) log[1- exp(xβ)/[1+exp(xβ)]]. 
Then, we can estimate β by quasi maximum likelihood estimation. Here, yi can 
take any value in [0, 1], but interpretation needs some caution as fractional values are 
regarded as a probability of choosing the value 1 (or zero) here. We will take fractional 
logit regression model to estimate the trade credit ratio function, where the dependent 
is the ratio of payment after delivery. 
  The second type of dependent variables, trade credit and transaction volume, 
are a positive continuous response. Here, we take an approach to estimate the 
exponential quasi maximum likelihood estimator, where the log likelihood function is 
specified as,  
 l i(β)= - yi  / m(x, β)-  log[m(x,β)]. 
This estimator is consistent for βas long as m(x, β) is correctly specified. Here, 
we assume m(x,β)=exp(xβ), as it is natural and not reasonable that trade credit 
volume or transaction volume follows an exponential distribution. 
In the third case, binary response variables, the probit estimator is useful. 
 
(b) Endogeneity of unobserved variables 
For independent variables, we have (a) characteristics of traded products, and (b) 
nature of transaction partners. Some variables are continuous, and some are binary 
response data or count data. As we have already argued, although we are interested in 
information representing the “level of enforcement technology,” we do not have 
sufficient and necessary information concerning which variables are correct variables, 
but have only proxies. Thus, our estimation might suffer from an endogeneity problem 
from unobserved variables.  
As our data is cross-sectional data, and does not have time variant information 
for each individual entity, we cannot fully utilize the panel data method to eliminate 
individually fixed effects. However, we have asked for specific information on each of 
two transactions for both sales and procurement for each firm so as to eliminate 
individually fixed characteristics by using the fixed effect estimator. However, 
unfortunately, we found that the data collection rate in our survey was not high, and 
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was often missing multiple data for sales or procurement. This strategy was therefore 
later abandoned. 
Instead, we broadened the definition of “individual” from “by firm” to “by 
ownership type,” as we are interested in behavior of FDI, compared to 
Government-owned firms or Private-firms. We carried out dummy variable regression 
by ownership-pairs (i.e., 3 x 3= 9 dummies). By doing this, we were able to eliminate 
ownership type unobservable variables.    
Our empirical motivation here is to estimate trade credit and transaction 
functions in order to evaluate the role of FDI firms in trade credit provision. As set out 
in the previous section (1.2), we have four empirical questions.  
Specification for each question and results will be shown below. 
 
4.2 Trade credit and transaction functions 
Empirical Question 1: Does a transaction with FDI provide credit to domestic firms? Is 
it bigger than that provided by other ownership type firms? 
To answer this question, we will estimate the trade credit ratio function and 
the trade credit volume function. First, we look at the trade credit ratio. From the model, 
the trade credit ratio is an increasing function of proxies of enforcement technology. We 
have this information for both directions of transaction; customer cum the surveyed 
firm (sales) pair, the surveyed firm cum supplier (procurement) pair. Coefficients β 
were estimated by fractional logit regression. Tables 4 and 5 present results 
respectively for sales and procurement. 
 We take shares of payment instruments as a key variable of enforcement 
technology. Column (1) for both Tables 4 and 5 present the basic relationship. Column 
(2) added ownership cum ownership dummy, then administrative region in (3), share of 
market area in (4), competitiveness or bargaining power in (5), start year of transaction 
in (6) are cumulatively added. For a transaction between a customer and surveyed firms, 
we have information of default experience (7), and ex post management to default in the 
period between 1999 and 2003 (8).  
In sales, we can see the following features; R(1) when payment is settled by 
cash, the trade credit ratio is lower than for commercial draft, a default payment 
instrument. This is robust for the whole specification. However, there is a doubt of 
endogeneity between the cash payment ratio and the trade credit ratio, via the cash on 
delivery ratio. Secondly R(2), for the ownership-pair dummy, dummies for an FDI 
customer with government-owned firms and FDI supplier show robust positive and 
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significant coefficients. This indicates that if a G firm and FDI firms sell to an FDI 
customer, they will provide a larger trade credit ratio, compared to the default case, i.e., 
Private surveyed firm cum Private customer in specification (1) to (5).  Thirdly R(3), in 
sales specification, addition of administration, share of market, competitiveness or 
default experiences did not erase the significance of ownership type dummies. R(4), if 
firms have taken ex post management measures to a default in a transaction in the 
most recent four years, they raised the trade credit ratio to the customer. This is an 
interesting result, but whether it is to be evaluated positively or negatively is still 
ambiguous. For a positive interpretation, we can say that a firm learns about payment 
enforcement technology, and thus can enlarge the credit ratio. However, groups of firms 
who stop transactions on default in the previous stage, raise trade credit 70 per cent, 
presumably towards new trading partners. This might be related to a tendency for 
newer transaction partners to offer larger credit in trade credit volume estimation, 
which is a counter-intuitive result. Competitiveness or start year of transaction did not 
show any significant trend.     
On the procurement side, the cash payment ratio shows a similar tendency 
with sales. The ownership dummy for FDI customer cum FDI seller shows robustly 
positive and significant coefficients, which is common in sales specifications. On the 
contrary, competitiveness or bargaining power proxies show positive significant 
coefficients; when the share of the products sold among the buyer’s input is higher, that 
is bargaining power is stronger, less trade credit was provided. If a potential alternative 
supplier exists, more trade credit was given. In total, these results imply that a more 
competitive supplier will provide less trade credit.        
<Table 4 Trade credit ratio function, (1) in sales> 
<Table 5 Trade credit ratio function, (2) in procurement > 
 
Empirical Question 2: Does a transaction with FDI generate a larger transaction 
volume due to a trade credit/enforcement technology factor 
The second question asks whether enforcement technology factors enhance trade credit 
volume and transaction volume. The model predicts that both variables are an 
increasing function of cash in hand of the buyer, as well as the enforcement technology 
of the seller. Data on cash in hand of the buyer and enforcement technology of the buyer 
is available only for transactions between surveyed firm-buyer and suppliers. Here the 
independent variables are the same as in the trade credit ratio function (Table 4), and 
coefficients were estimated by exponential quasi maximum likelihood function.  
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  The findings are that R(5) payment by cash reduces trade credit volume and 
transaction volume, compared to a case where payment is by commercial draft. R(6) 
ownership dummies do not show any robust significance, R(7) higher bargaining power 
of the seller reduces trade credit volume, R(8) a newer transaction partner will provide 
a larger trade credit, and transaction volumes are also large. This is a counter-intuitive 
result. R(9), as the model predicts, cash in hand matters in trade credit, cash in hand of 
the buyer limits the trade credit provided by the seller, but does not affect transaction 
volume.  
 
4.3 Probability function of default experiences 
Empirical Question 3 Does FDI have better enforcement technology compared to 
domestic firms? 
In order to test what factors affect the probability of default, probit estimation is carried 
out in Table 7. Independent variables are more or less same as the trade credit function 
in sales. Results on the “no default” dummy and “completely defaulted” dummy show 
asymmetric results.  
 In the no default probability function, the ownership dummy becomes 
insignificant when administration and competition factors are added. R(10) There is no 
ownership-specific factor, other than competitiveness, market, and so on, factors that 
matter in no default probability or complete default probability. R(11) Among 
competition factors, the more rivalry that exists, the less probable default will be. R(12) 
In a complete default function, when traded goods are unique for the buyer, the 
probability is lowered 60 per cent. Uniqueness or bargaining power of products can 
reduce default risk.    
  
4.4 External effect of enforcement technology  
The last empirical questions were;   
Q.4 Does FDI enforcement technology have a positive external effect on trade credit 
enforcement? 
 
The model indicated that sequential trading induces a positive external effect of 
enforcement technology. What we can do to test this proposition with the data in hand is 
to test whether credit given by the supplier is affected by the enforcement technology of 
the surveyed firm towards their customer. Enforcement technology of the surveyed firm 
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is exercised towards the customer to secure the repayment of credit, is completely 
insignificant to a transaction between the surveyed firm and their supplier if the 
external effect above does not exit. If it shows a significance with positive sign, a 
positive external effect exists.  We tested both dependents here, the trade credit ratio 
and the trade credit volume. 
 The findings here are as follows; R(13) in trade credit ratio from the supplier to 
the surveyed firms, ownership type still matters even after competition, experience, and 
market share factors are controlled. To be specific, if the surveyed firm is FDI or a 
Government-owned firm and the trading partner is an FDI customer, trade credit 
volumes are increased. R(14) if the buyer required a higher cash on delivery ratio from 
his customer, the trade credit ratio from supplier to the buyer is lowered. That is, firms 
which sell at a higher cash on delivery ratio towards customers, pay at higher cash on 
delivery ratios towards their suppliers. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper, we tested and confirmed that FDI and G contributed to provision of credit 
and had a positive external effect on trade credit enforcement towards China’s economy. 
(1) Sales towards FDI customers have the power to increase trade credit ratios, even 
after controlling following factors such as choice of payment instruments, 
competitiveness, ex post default management. This implies that FDI do provide trade 
credit, not only because they have superior liquidity, but because they are superior in 
enforcement of trade credit repayment. (2) Cash constraints of the buyer matter in 
decisions of trade credit provided by the seller, as the model in Yanagawa, et al. [2006] 
predicted, and this implies that strategic default seriously affects SMEs in China. (3) A 
spillover effect in payment enforcement technology in transactions with FDI customers 
exists. These are consistent with the model’s prediction. However, we also found (4) that 
a more competitive supplier will prefer cash on delivery payment, and consequently, will 
provide less trade credit to the economy. (5) For a shorter transaction period, the 
supplier will provide larger trade credit. These seem to contradict the model’s prediction 
or intuition.  
 How to capture the level of enforcement technology is still a problem ridden 
with ambiguity, and it will be necessary to reexamine how each factor that constitutes 
enforcement technology here, such as the length of transaction, bargaining power 
among rivals, the uniqueness of goods, and the number of rivals interact with each other, 
and then affect the enforcement power of the firms, and trade credit provision decisions.  
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Figure 1  Map of survey sites 
 
 
 
(Source) Author.  
(Map) http://www.lonelyplanet.com/mapshells/nerth_east_asia/china/china.htm
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Table 1  Distribution of location and ownership type of surveyed firms 
 
(Source) JICA-PBOC Survey and IDE-DRC Survey. 
Location and ownerships of surveyed firms
(# of firms) Beijing Dongguang Xian Yibin Total
FDI 26 7 16 0 49
G 41 8 56 19 124
P 133 91 150 91 465
Total 200 106 222 110 638
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<Figure2  Information structure of the survey> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Surveyed firms
A Supplier in 
the home city  
A  Supplier 
outside the 
home city  
A Customer in 
the home city  
A Customer 
outside  the 
home city  
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Table 2  Ratio of payment after delivery in a transaction  
 
 
* Ratio of Payment after delivery
*Sales
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 90 100 77.38 30.97 21
FDI G 0 100 100 77.74 31.65 19
P 0 67.5 100 58.89 38.60 36
FDI 0 90 100 69.69 40.43 16
G G 0 70 100 60.40 41.68 85
P 0 70 100 57.53 39.90 306
FDI 0 30 100 49.00 39.39 40
P G 0 55 100 54.07 39.41 88
P 0 50 100 49.10 39.75 402
1013
*Procurement
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 60 100 68.42 32.87 19
FDI G 0 70 100 59.31 39.01 36
P 0 70 100 65.33 33.35 15
FDI 0 80 100 58.33 42.77 27
G G 0 30 100 44.62 39.32 79
P 0 52.5 100 53.00 39.06 78
FDI 0 50 100 49.28 42.63 118
P G 0 40 100 45.35 41.05 273
P 0 70 100 55.51 39.30 319
(Source) IDE-DRC Survey, JICA-PBOC Survey 964
(Note) The boxed party I.e. buyer or seller, is the directly surveyed firms in our survey.
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Table 3  Transaction Volume by ownership 
 
 
  
 
*Transaction volume   
*Sale
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 30 800 50000 3,518 11,073 20
FDI G 20 525 13960 1,567 3,615 14
P 30 500 30000 1,926 5,929 25
FDI 30 500 100000 6,055 23,452 18
G G 10 500 100000 3,000 12,481 65
P 5 500 40000 1,733 4,495 261
FDI 12 475 13960 1,497 2,995 26
P G 10 240 50000 1,759 6,392 73
P 2.5 389 800000 4,102 44,924 318
*Procurement
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 8 983 25000 5,291 9,261 18
FDI G 43 575 5000 1,116 1,403 14
P 10 300 10000 985 1,927 30
FDI 1.8 145 20000 1,146 3,949 25
G G 1.5 565 22500 2,001 3,520 78
P 5 300 19000 979 2,411 75
FDI 2.5 200 9000 821 1,602 114
P G 1 315 28726 1,590 3,326 262
P 2 320 80000 1,529 5,362 302
(Source) JICA PBOC survey 918
(Note) Boxed party I.e. buyer or seller, is the directly surveyed firms in our survey.
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Table 4  Trade credit ratio function, (1) in sales 
(Source) Author. (Note) 1) Fractional logit estimator. Coefficients for dummy variables indicate a marginal effect when x changes from 0 to 1. 2) Bold is coefficient with 5% 
significance.    
T ra d e  c re d i t  ra tio  in  s a le s
D e p e n d e n t:  R a t io  o f  p a y m e n t  a f te r  d e liv e ry  in  s a le s  tr a n s a c t io n
(1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 )
L o g  L ik e l ih o o d -5 9 7 .4 -5 7 6 .6 -5 6 9 .4 -4 8 4 .8 -4 6 8 .3 -4 1 9 .8 -1 7 6 .9 -1 5 1 .2
P e a rs o n  R e s id u a ls (1 /d f ) 0 .6 4 8 0 .6 4 2 0 .6 3 7 0 .6 0 .6 0 .6 2 2 0 .5 8 7 0 .5 8 9
A IC 1 .2 0 4 1 .1 9 8 1 .1 9 0 1 .2 1 .2 1 .1 9 0 1 .1 8 9 1 .2 1 4
#  o f  o b s 1 0 0 1 9 8 4 9 8 4 8 4 3 8 1 6 7 4 1 3 3 3 2 8 7
S h a re  o f  p a y m e n t  in s tru m e n ts  (% ) C o e f . S .E . P > |z | C o e f . S .E . P > |z | C o e f . S .E . ｚ C o e f . S .E . ｚ C o e f . S .E . ｚ P > |z | C o e f . S .E . P > |z | C o e f . S .E . P > |z | C o e f . S .E .
c a s h -0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 0 -0 .0 0 9 0 .0 0 2 -4 .5 3 0 -0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 2 -3 .2 9 0 -0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 3 -2 .8 2 0 0 .0 0 5 -0 .0 1 5 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 4 -0 .0 1 7 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 0 -0 .0 1 9 0 .0 0 5
c h e q u e 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 5 8 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 2 1 .8 9 0 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 2 2 .5 9 0 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 2 1 .7 3 0 0 .0 8 4 -0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 5 0 .6 5 1 -0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 3 0 .4 6 7 -0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 4
b a n k n o te 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 5 5 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 1 0 .9 3 3 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 2 0 .2 5 0 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 2 0 .5 1 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 2 -0 .2 0 0 0 .8 4 5 -0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 5 0 .2 0 2 -0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 4 0 .1 2 0 -0 .0 0 9 0 .0 0 5
b a n k d ra f t 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 2 0 .1 3 8 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 3 0 .7 5 0 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 3 0 .4 6 0 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 3 0 .8 1 0 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 3 0 .6 2 0 0 .5 3 7 -0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 5 0 .3 7 7 -0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 6 0 .6 4 2 -0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 6
c re d i tc a rd 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 8 0 .3 6 1 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 8 0 .4 1 4 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 8 0 .9 2 0 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 8 0 .8 9 0 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 8 0 .7 9 0 0 .4 2 9 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 9 0 .4 1 6 0 .0 1 5 0 .0 1 3 0 .2 5 8 0 .0 1 5 0 .0 1 3
(C o m m e rc ia l  d ra f t)
B u y e r-S e lle r  O w n e rs h ip s  (d u m m y )
d G G _ C 0 .3 8 8 0 .2 1 0 0 .0 6 5 0 .5 3 8 0 .2 1 3 2 .5 2 0 0 .4 9 0 0 .2 5 6 1 .9 2 0 0 .5 6 7 0 .2 6 1 2 .1 7 0 0 .0 3 0 0 .6 2 6 0 .2 8 7 0 .0 2 9 0 .1 4 2 0 .3 5 3 0 .6 8 8 0 .1 0 9 0 .4 1 0
d G F _ C 1 .3 4 4 0 .4 0 4 0 .0 0 1 1 .1 2 8 0 .4 2 5 2 .6 5 0 1 .1 3 9 0 .4 3 7 2 .6 1 0 1 .2 1 1 0 .4 4 1 2 .7 4 0 0 .0 0 6 1 .2 5 2 0 .4 5 1 0 .0 0 6 0 .8 7 1 0 .6 5 1 0 .1 8 1 0 .7 5 2 0 .6 7 8
d G P _ C 0 .2 8 8 0 .1 9 1 0 .1 3 2 0 .2 9 7 0 .1 9 1 1 .5 6 0 0 .3 6 6 0 .2 0 8 1 .7 6 0 0 .3 9 3 0 .2 0 8 1 .8 9 0 0 .0 5 9 0 .5 5 5 0 .2 0 6 0 .0 0 7 1 .0 3 9 0 .3 0 3 0 .0 0 1 1 .0 1 6 0 .3 2 1
d F F _ C 1 .3 4 1 0 .4 1 2 0 .0 0 1 1 .0 8 0 0 .4 1 4 2 .6 1 0 0 .8 2 7 0 .4 1 1 2 .0 1 0 0 .8 6 1 0 .4 0 9 2 .1 1 0 0 .0 3 5 1 .0 5 3 0 .4 1 9 0 .0 1 2 1 .1 7 7 0 .6 2 4 0 .0 5 9 1 .1 2 4 0 .6 6 2
d F G _ C 0 .7 2 9 0 .4 7 4 0 .1 2 4 0 .9 5 8 0 .4 7 3 2 .0 3 0 0 .3 8 9 0 .5 3 9 0 .7 2 0 0 .4 0 7 0 .5 4 4 0 .7 5 0 0 .4 5 4 0 .5 6 6 0 .5 8 3 0 .3 3 2 1 .3 0 2 0 .6 8 0 0 .0 5 6 1 .0 8 5 0 .6 6 7
d F P _ C 0 .0 0 7 0 .2 5 3 0 .9 7 7 -0 .0 2 1 0 .2 6 2 -0 .0 8 0 -0 .0 9 4 0 .3 0 0 -0 .3 1 0 -0 .0 7 2 0 .3 0 0 -0 .2 4 0 0 .8 1 1 -0 .2 1 6 0 .3 1 4 0 .4 9 2 -0 .3 8 9 0 .5 5 1 0 .4 8 0 -0 .4 8 0 0 .7 7 8
d P G _ C 0 .2 6 3 0 .1 2 8 0 .0 4 0 0 .4 1 6 0 .1 3 5 3 .0 9 0 0 .4 0 4 0 .1 4 4 2 .8 0 0 0 .4 7 1 0 .1 4 8 3 .1 8 0 0 .0 0 1 0 .4 3 7 0 .1 6 0 0 .0 0 6 0 .7 1 4 0 .2 3 9 0 .0 0 3 0 .6 8 3 0 .2 5 7
d P F _ C 0 .4 8 7 0 .2 7 6 0 .0 7 7 0 .3 9 1 0 .2 7 8 1 .4 1 0 0 .2 4 0 0 .2 8 9 0 .8 3 0 0 .2 9 6 0 .2 9 5 1 .0 0 0 0 .3 1 6 0 .2 5 6 0 .3 2 8 0 .4 3 6 0 .6 2 2 0 .4 3 0 0 .1 4 8 0 .3 1 9 0 .4 2 7
(d P P _ C )
A d m in is ta ra t iv e  re g io n  (d u m m y )
B e ij in g  0 .3 3 4 0 .1 5 3 3 8 2 .1 7 0 .3 1 3 0 .1 6 3 1 .9 2 0 .2 8 3 0 .1 6 8 1 .6 8 0 0 .0 5 5 0 .2 3 9 0 .1 7 9 0 .1 8 2 0 .6 2 7 0 .2 4 9 0 .0 1 2 0 .6 7 0 0 .2 7 3
D o n g g u a n g  -0 .3 7 6 0 .1 7 7 4 7 -2 .1 2 -0 .4 8 9 0 .1 9 1 -2 .5 5 -0 .4 3 7 0 .1 9 8 -2 .2 1 0 0 .0 1 1 -0 .4 8 7 0 .2 0 8 0 .0 1 9 -0 .4 3 7 0 .3 0 2 0 .1 4 8 -0 .4 1 1 0 .3 3 0
X ia n  -0 .2 9 6 0 .1 5 4 3 1 -1 .9 2 -0 .3 0 2 0 .1 6 6 -1 .8 2 -0 .2 4 7 0 .1 7 1 -1 .4 4 0 0 .0 6 9 -0 .2 7 9 0 .1 8 0 0 .1 2 2 -0 .3 5 8 0 .2 7 0 0 .1 8 5 -0 .3 9 4 0 .2 9 2
(Y ib n )
S h a re  o f  m a rk e t  s ite  (% )
H o m e  c ity  -0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 2 -1 .3 8 0 -0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 2 -1 .5 3 0 0 .1 2 6 -0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 6 6 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 3
E x p o r t  0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 3 0 .9 3 0 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 3 0 .9 7 0 0 .3 3 1 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 3 0 .2 9 7 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 5
C o m p e tit iv e n e ss  o f  g o o d s
U n iq u e (  If  g o o d s  is  u n iq u e  to  c u s to m e r= = 1 , IF  N O T  = = 0 ) -0 .0 0 9 0 .1 2 1 9 -0 .0 7 0 .9 4 1 -0 .0 1 4 0 .1 3 0 0 .9 1 3 -0 .2 1 5 0 .2 2 1
#  o f  r iv a l(n o  r iv a ly = 0 , fe w  r iv a l= 1 , a  f e w  r iv a l= 2 , n u m e ro u s  r iv a l= 3 )  0 .0 2 5 0 .0 6 6 3 0 .3 7 0 .7 1 0 .0 4 6 0 .0 7 3 0 .5 2 9 -0 .0 0 9 0 .1 1 7
L e n g th  o f  tr a n s a c t io n  
s ta r t  y e a r  o f  tra n s a c t io n 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .1 9 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
D e fa u lt  e x p e r ie n c e s  (d u m m y )
N o  d e fa u l t  -0 .3 7 7 0 .3 5 4 0 .2 8 7 -0 .7 1 7 0 .3 7 6
d e la y e d 0 .0 2 5 0 .1 9 0 0 .8 9 5 -0 .0 5 2 0 .2 0 5
(C o m p le te ly  d e fa u lt)
E x  p o s t  m a n a g e m e n t to  d e fa u l t  (d u m m y )
c h a n g e te rm s 0 .4 1 3 0 .2 4 0 0 .0 8 5 0 .5 1 8 0 .2 5 0
s to p tra d e 0 .6 8 1 0 .2 5 0 0 .0 0 6 0 .7 7 2 0 .2 6 0
S u it 0 .5 9 1 0 .2 3 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .6 1 8 0 .2 4 4
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Table 5  Trade credit ratio function, (2) in procurement 
(Source) Author. (Note) 1) Fractional logit estimator. Coefficients for dummy variables indicate a marginal effect when x changes from 0 to 1. 2) Bold is coefficient with 5% 
significance.    
T r a d e  c r e d it  r a t io  in  p r o c u re m e n t  
D e p e n d e n t :  R a tio  o f  p a y m e n t a f te r  d e l iv e ry  in  p ro c u re m e n t  t r a n s a c t io n  
(1 ) (2 ) ( 3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 )
L o g  L ik e lih o o d -5 8 5 .1 -5 6 0 .3 -5 4 8 .1 9 -4 6 3 -4 1 2 .5 -3 8 6 .0
P e a r s o n  R e s id u a ls 0 .6 5 0 0 .6 4 7 0 .6 3 8 0 .6 4 7 0 .6 3 8 0 .6 3 4
A IC 1 .2 0 4 1 .2 0 7 1 .1 8 8 1 .1 9 7 1 .1 9 6 1 .1 9 5
#  o f  o b s 9 8 0 9 5 0 9 5 0 8 0 5 7 2 3 6 8 1
S h a re  o f  p a y m e n t in s t ru m e n ts  (% ) C o e f . S .E . P > |z | C o e f . S .E . P > |z | C o e f . S .E . P > |z | C o e f . S .E . P > |z | C o e f . S .E . P > |z | C o e f . S .E . P > |z |
c a s h -0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 4 -0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 4 7 -0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 4 3 -0 .0 1 6 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 3 -0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 5 6 -0 .0 2 0 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 5
c h e q u e -0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 1 3 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 0 -0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 5 0 .5 5 8 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 3 0 .2 7 4 -0 .0 0 9 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 8 0
b a n k n o te 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 1 0 .2 3 4 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 3 9 -0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 5 0 .1 4 8 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 3 0 .8 9 2 -0 .0 1 2 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 9 0
b a n k d ra f t 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 1 0 .8 5 2 -0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 3 0 .1 1 3 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 3 0 .7 6 3 -0 .0 0 8 0 .0 0 6 0 .1 4 3 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 4 0 .9 8 4 -0 .0 1 3 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 8 8
c re d i tc a rd -0 .0 0 9 0 .0 0 8 0 .3 0 7 -0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 9 0 .4 2 2 -0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 8 0 .5 5 1 -0 .0 0 4 0 .0 1 1 0 .7 3 2 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 1 1 0 .5 3 8 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 1 9 0 .6 6 9
(C o m m e rc ia l  d ra f t )
B u y e r -S e l le r  O w n e r s h ip s  (d u m m y )
d G  x  G _ S -0 .4 4 7 0 .1 9 8 0 .0 2 4 -0 .3 3 2 0 .1 9 5 0 .0 9 0 -0 .1 6 1 0 .2 2 0 0 .4 6 6 -0 .0 5 8 0 .2 2 8 0 .8 0 0 -0 .1 1 1 0 .2 3 8 0 .6 4 1
d G  x  F _ S 0 .1 3 2 0 .3 3 5 0 .6 9 4 0 .1 0 0 0 .3 3 4 0 .7 6 5 0 .4 4 2 0 .3 6 7 0 .2 2 9 0 .4 6 5 0 .4 1 8 0 .2 6 6 0 .4 6 9 0 .4 3 2 0 .2 7 8
d G  x  P _ S -0 .0 1 4 0 .1 9 9 0 .9 4 5 0 .1 0 6 0 .1 9 9 0 .5 9 3 0 .3 7 0 0 .2 3 6 0 .1 1 7 0 .2 7 7 0 .2 5 1 0 .2 7 0 0 .3 5 5 0 .2 6 5 0 .1 7 9
d F  x  F _ S 0 .7 4 8 0 .3 6 1 0 .0 3 8 0 .7 1 3 0 .3 5 7 0 .0 4 6 0 .6 9 1 0 .3 4 9 0 .0 4 8 0 .7 9 5 0 .4 0 1 0 .0 4 7 0 .6 6 6 0 .4 5 3 0 .1 4 2
d F  x  G _ S 0 .4 6 0 0 .4 3 7 0 .2 9 3 0 .4 6 5 0 .3 9 4 0 .2 3 8 -0 .1 7 5 0 .3 9 4 0 .6 5 8 -0 .1 4 1 0 .4 4 0 0 .7 4 9 -0 .1 8 3 0 .4 5 4 0 .6 8 7
d F  x  P _ S 0 .1 4 3 0 .2 8 9 0 .6 2 0 0 .0 3 8 0 .2 7 4 0 .8 8 9 -0 .1 5 0 0 .3 0 8 0 .6 2 6 -0 .2 3 3 0 .3 3 7 0 .4 8 8 -0 .3 1 3 0 .3 4 0 0 .3 5 7
d P  x  G _ S -0 .3 1 9 0 .1 3 5 0 .0 1 8 -0 .2 7 3 0 .1 4 2 0 .0 5 5 -0 .2 3 3 0 .1 5 9 0 .1 4 3 -0 .1 4 5 0 .1 6 5 0 .3 7 8 -0 .2 6 3 0 .1 7 1 0 .1 2 4
d P  x  F _ S -0 .1 8 0 0 .1 8 2 0 .3 2 3 -0 .2 2 8 0 .1 9 1 0 .2 3 2 -0 .1 5 2 0 .2 0 5 0 .4 5 7 -0 .0 6 0 0 .2 1 4 0 .7 7 9 -0 .1 3 3 0 .2 2 0 0 .5 4 6
(d P  x  P _ S )
A d m in is ta ra t iv e  r e g io n  (d u m m y )
B e i j in g  0 .1 5 1 0 .1 6 6 1 5 0 .3 6 2 0 .0 1 3 0 .1 8 3 0 .9 4 3 0 .1 8 5 0 .1 9 0 0 .3 2 9 0 .0 6 7 0 .1 9 9 0 .7 3 6
D o n g g u a n g  -0 .1 9 5 0 .1 9 3 7 7 0 .3 1 3 -0 .1 4 2 0 .2 2 1 0 .5 2 2 0 .0 5 8 0 .2 2 2 0 .7 9 3 -0 .0 8 5 0 .2 3 4 0 .7 1 8
X ia n  -0 .6 9 9 0 .1 7 1 4 1 0 -0 .8 0 7 0 .1 9 0 0 .0 0 0 -0 .5 5 5 0 .1 9 7 0 .0 0 5 -0 .6 0 4 0 .2 0 4 0 .0 0 3
(Y ib n )
S h a re  o f  m a rk e t  s i te  (% )
H o m e  c i ty  -0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 2 0 .1 9 1 -0 .0 8 5 0 .2 3 4 0 .7 1 8 -0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 2 0 .4 0 6
E x p o r t  0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 3 0 .1 0 0 -0 .6 0 4 0 .2 0 4 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 3 0 .1 0 5
C o m p e t i t iv e n e s s  o f  g o o d s
G o o d s  b y  th e  s u p p l ie r /  T o ta l  in p u t  o f  b u y e r ( % ) -0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 1 6 -0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 1 2
E x is te n c e  o f  p o te n t ia l  s u p p l ie r (Y e s = 1 , N o = 0 )  0 .4 5 8 0 .1 9 1 0 .0 1 6 0 .4 7 8 0 .2 0 2 0 .0 1 8
L e n g th  o f  t r a n s a c tio n  
s ta r t  y e a r  o f  t r a n s a c t io n 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 6 2
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Table 6  Trade credit and transaction volume functions  
 
(Source) Author. (Note) 1) Exponential quasi maximum likelihood estimator. Coefficients for 
dummy variables indicate marginal effect when x changes from 0 to 1. 2) Bold is coefficient 
with 5% significance.    
 
 
 
 
Volume 
Dependent: Trade credit volumed from supplier to surveyed firm Dependent: Transaction volume between supplier and surveyed
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Log Likelihood -4999 -3626 -5590 -4270
Pearson Residuals 1.6 1.7 4 2
AIC 13.1 13.1 16 15
# of obs 764 557 721 573
Share of payment instruments (%) Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z|
cash -0.016 0.004 0.000 -0.019 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.717 -0.009 0.005 0.045
cheque -0.006 0.003 0.062 -0.007 0.005 0.143 0.005 0.005 0.279 -0.004 0.004 0.298
banknote -0.006 0.003 0.094 -0.007 0.005 0.151 0.006 0.005 0.262 -0.005 0.004 0.286
bankdraft -0.006 0.004 0.103 -0.011 0.005 0.040 0.017 0.005 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.787
creditcard -0.017 0.009 0.068 -0.024 0.008 0.002 -0.006 0.014 0.642 -0.005 0.016 0.749
(Commercial draft)
Buyer-Seller Ownerships (dummy)
dGG_S -0.238 0.192 0.217 -0.463 0.212 0.029 -0.155 0.234 0.509 -0.157 0.213 0.461
dGF_S 0.388 0.309 0.209 0.156 0.371 0.674 0.245 0.525 0.640 -0.372 0.283 0.189
dGP_S 0.018 0.204 0.929 -0.666 0.248 0.007 -0.164 0.390 0.674 0.237 0.421 0.573
dFF_S 0.120 0.218 0.581 0.275 0.348 0.429 0.235 0.309 0.446 -0.469 0.386 0.224
dFG_S 0.046 0.244 0.849 -0.171 0.485 0.724 -0.297 0.393 0.450 -0.971 0.474 0.041
dFP_S 0.027 0.205 0.896 0.090 0.242 0.709 -0.278 0.294 0.344 -0.765 0.316 0.016
dPG_S -0.128 0.121 0.290 -0.278 0.147 0.059 0.120 0.197 0.543 0.069 0.151 0.647
dPF_S -0.035 0.152 0.821 -0.133 0.182 0.465 -0.210 0.209 0.315 0.088 0.177 0.620
(dPP_S)
Administarative region (dummy)
Beijing 0.634 0.151 0.000 0.738 0.183 0.000 1.383 0.210 0.000 0.751 0.184 0.000
Dongguang 0.103 0.158 0.513 -0.142 0.187 0.445 0.770 0.241 0.001 0.107 0.183 0.561
Xian 0.071 0.144 0.622 -0.174 0.163 0.286 1.785 0.196 0.000 1.125 0.185 0.000
(Yibn)
Bargaining power
Goods by the supplier/ Total input 0.005 0.002 0.022 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.020 0.003 0.000 0.021 0.002 0.000
Existence of potential supplier(Ye 0.345 0.179 0.054 0.438 0.250 0.080 -0.104 0.170 0.539 -0.144 0.175 0.410
Length of transaction 
start year of transaction 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
Cash in hand 
cash flow 2001 0.000 9E-05 0.003 5E-05 9E-05 0.62
cash oustanding 2001 0.000 3E-06 0.001 4E-05 8E-05 0.58
Transaction volume 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 sale2001 0.000 0.000 0.332 0.000 0.000 0.000
Transaction volume^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 sale2001 0.000 0.000 0.449 0.000 0.000 0.003
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Table 7  Probability of “no default” and “complete default”  
 
(Source) Author.  
(Note) 1) Probit estimator. Coefficients for dummy variables indicate a marginal effect when 
x changes from 0 to 1. 2) Bold is coefficient with 5% significance.    
 
 
 
 
Probability of no default and complete default
Dependent: No default dummy Dependent: Completely default
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Log Likelihood -610.7 -431.8 -562.5 -406.1
Pearson Residuals(1/df) 1.014 1.036 1.016 1.015
AIC 1.285 1.235 1.189 1.168
# of obs 972 735 970 733
Share of payment instruments (%) Exp B s.e. P>|z| Exp B s.e. P>|z| Exp B s.e. P>|z| Exp B s.e. P>|z|
cash 0.993 0.001 0.000 0.995 0.004 0.203 0.995 0.001 0.002 1.003 0.004 0.489
cheque 0.994 0.001 0.000 0.994 0.004 0.115 0.996 0.001 0.000 1.003 0.003 0.399
banknote 0.995 0.001 0.000 0.996 0.004 0.243 0.994 0.001 0.000 1.000 0.003 0.942
bankdraft 0.991 0.002 0.000 0.990 0.004 0.013 0.992 0.002 0.000 1.002 0.004 0.664
creditcard 1.013 0.005 0.013 1.017 0.007 0.010 0.989 0.006 0.051 0.995 0.007 0.445
(Commercial draft)
Buyer-Seller Ownerships (dummy)
dGG_C 1.076 0.170 0.641 0.787 0.173 0.277 1.119 0.178 0.478 1.353 0.291 0.161
dGF_C 0.647 0.232 0.223 0.487 0.186 0.060 0.628 0.225 0.194 0.987 0.367 0.972
dGP_C 1.348 0.206 0.050 1.188 0.212 0.335 1.048 0.165 0.768 1.317 0.241 0.132
dFF_C 2.160 0.639 0.009 1.436 0.494 0.293 0.636 0.217 0.185 0.953 0.348 0.895
dFG_C 0.759 0.273 0.444 0.356 0.190 0.053 1.515 0.490 0.199 2.142 0.835 0.051
dFP_C 1.336 0.290 0.182 0.830 0.214 0.471 0.599 0.159 0.054 1.008 0.304 0.980
dPG_C 1.017 0.105 0.868 0.879 0.115 0.325 0.987 0.105 0.904 1.166 0.158 0.256
dPF_C 1.001 0.234 0.996 0.634 0.188 0.123 1.001 0.236 0.995 1.445 0.393 0.176
(dPP_C)
Ratio of cash on delivery 1.679 0.196 0.000 1.917 0.277 0.000 0.833 0.101 0.130 0.862 0.127 0.311
Administarative region (dummy)
Beijing 1.601 0.244 0.002 0.771 0.116 0.084
Dongguang 1.262 0.218 0.178 1.510 0.253 0.014
Xian 1.531 0.232 0.005 0.779 0.117 0.095
(Yibn)
Share of market site (%)
Home city 1.0005 0.002 0.754 0.998 0.002 0.204
Export 1.0004 0.003 0.884 1.000 0.003 0.994
Competitiveness of goods
Unique( If goods is unique to customer==1, IF NOT == 1.195 0.130 0.103 0.648 0.072 0.000
# of rival(no rivaly=0, few rival=1, a few rival=2, num 0.883 0.052 0.036 1.085 0.066 0.183
Length of transaction 
start year of transaction 0.9999 2E-04 0.639 1.000 0.000 0.060
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Table 8  Positive external effect of “buyer’s enforcement technology” 
(Source) Author.  
(Note) 1) Fractional logit estimator for trade credit ratio. Exponential quasi maximum likelihood for 
trade credit volume. Coefficients for dummy variables indicate a marginal effect when x changes from 
0 to 1. 2) Bold is coefficient with 5% significance.    
External effect of enforcement technology 
Dependent: Ratio of payment after delivery  from supplier to the surveyed Dependent: Trade credit volume from supplier to surveyed firm
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Log Likelihood -539.2 -249.5 -6,374 -2,763
Pearson Residuals(1/df) 0.654 0.611 126 1
AIC 1.219 1.171 15.40 12.45
# of observation 906 469 830 448
Share of payment instruments (%) Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z|
cash -0.005 0.002 0.005 -0.015 0.006 0.012 0.037 0.002 0.000 -0.009 0.004 0.012
 0.002 0.001 0.084 -0.010 0.006 0.058 0.043 0.002 0.000 -0.004 0.003 0.178
banknote 0.002 0.001 0.183 -0.014 0.006 0.012 0.044 0.002 0.000 -0.005 0.003 0.182
bankdraft -0.003 0.003 0.310 -0.010 0.006 0.106 0.047 0.008 0.000 -0.004 0.004 0.373
creditcard 0.003 0.007 0.644 -0.002 0.010 0.864 0.046 0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.005 0.289
(Commercial draft)
Buyer-Seller Ownerships (dummy)
dG x G_C -0.285 0.199 0.153 0.071 0.327 0.828 0.315 0.187 0.092 0.075 0.251 0.765
dG x F_C 1.340 0.456 0.003 1.945 0.755 0.010 0.706 0.320 0.027 0.081 0.314 0.796
dG x P_C 0.071 0.197 0.717 0.491 0.260 0.059 0.457 0.166 0.006 0.305 0.174 0.079
dF x F_C 1.618 0.319 0.000 1.449 0.668 0.030 1.357 0.243 0.000 0.104 0.349 0.766
dF x G_C 0.530 0.447 0.236 -0.076 0.540 0.889 1.128 0.423 0.008 -0.209 0.352 0.553
dF x P_C 0.086 0.265 0.745 0.130 0.330 0.693 2.451 0.833 0.003 0.066 0.266 0.805
dP x G_C -0.139 0.134 0.299 -0.321 0.214 0.134 1.092 0.391 0.005 0.025 0.149 0.869
dP x F_C 0.237 0.331 0.475 -0.470 0.390 0.227 0.668 0.234 0.004 -0.298 0.262 0.256
(dP x P_C)
Administarative region (dummy)
Beijing -0.300 0.234 0.200 0.601 0.174 0.001
Dongguang -0.322 0.279 0.249 0.221 0.186 0.234
Xian -0.850 0.247 0.001 -0.058 0.187 0.756
(Yibn)
Share of market site (%)
Home city 0.000 0.003 0.934 0.0011 0.0021 0.598
Export 0.008 0.004 0.059 0.0055 0.0025 0.029
Competitiveness 
Unique( If goods is unique to customer==1, IF NOT == 0.187 0.169 0.267 0.075 0.119 0.530
# of rival(no rivaly=0, few rival=1, a few rival=2, num 0.185 0.089 0.037 0.056 0.077 0.465
Length of transaction 
start year of transaction 0.001 0.000 0.056 0.0021 0.000 0.000
Ex post management to default (dummy)
change terms 0.555 0.236 0.018 0.370 0.152 0.015
stop transaction 0.194 0.238 0.414 0.3519 0.153 0.021
suit 0.328 0.230 0.153 0.5349 0.166 0.001
Ratio of cash on delivery -1.689 0.263 0.000 -1.038 0.228 0.000
Transaction volume 0.001 #### 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
Transaction volume^2 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Appendix  1  Payment instruments between customers and surveyed firms 
 
*Payment instruments between customer and surveyed firms
** cash
*Total 
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 10 100 23.86 30.00 22
FDI G 0 20 100 32.83 40.42 23
P 0 10 100 27.92 36.00 36
FDI 0 0 10 0.79 2.51 19
G G 0 0 100 9.72 21.61 88
P 0 0 100 8.69 20.94 312
FDI 0 0 100 22.30 35.97 40
P G 0 10 100 32.93 36.99 92
P 0 10 100 23.93 31.64 410
1042
*cheque
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 20 100 24.55 30.04 22
FDI G 0 20 100 43.04 45.17 23
P 0 20 100 40.14 41.88 35
FDI 0 30 100 39.47 44.62 19
G G 0 50 100 48.35 42.57 88
P 0 30 100 44.66 45.10 313
FDI 0 5 100 34.23 41.98 40
P G 0 30 100 40.76 42.22 92
P 0 30 100 40.76 40.39 412
1044
*bank note
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 0 100 21.82 39.11 22
FDI G 0 0 100 13.04 30.96 23
P 0 0 100 30.14 44.09 36
FDI 0 0 100 43.68 49.13 19
G G 0 0 100 29.94 39.66 89
P 0 0 100 37.38 42.22 315
FDI 0 0 100 26.75 40.36 40
P G 0 0 100 19.24 31.80 92
P 0 0 100 26.45 37.26 410
1046
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*bank draft
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 0 100 29.05 39.74 21
FDI G 0 0 100 10.87 29.99 23
P 0 0 30 2.00 6.77 35
FDI 0 0 100 9.74 23.83 19
G G 0 0 100 12.47 24.65 87
P 0 0 100 8.01 20.01 313
FDI 0 0 100 10.75 28.59 40
P G 0 0 80 5.16 15.38 92
P 0 0 100 6.88 21.27 408
1038
*commercial draft
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 0 15 0.71 3.27 21
FDI G 0 0 5 0.22 1.04 23
P 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 35
FDI 0 0 30 4.74 11.24 19
G G 0 0 70 2.88 10.13 86
P 0 0 100 2.30 13.14 311
FDI 0 0 100 2.80 15.88 40
P G 0 0 55 0.71 5.85 91
P 0 0 100 1.69 9.77 409
1035
*credit card
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 21
FDI G 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 23
P 0 0 30 0.86 5.07 35
FDI 0 0 30 1.58 6.88 19
G G 0 0 80 1.34 8.98 87
P 0 0 50 0.51 4.31 311
FDI 0 0 80 3.63 15.19 40
P G 0 0 90 1.09 9.43 92
P 0 0 100 1.26 7.46 408
1036
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Appendix 2  Marketing areas  
 
                                                             
*Share of main Market (1) export   with customer
*Total 
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 56 100 46.83 37.92 23
FDI G 0 0 100 19.61 32.49 22
P 0 0 100 23.13 36.64 34
FDI 0 0 99 10.00 26.24 14
G G 0 0 70 2.10 10.24 63
P 0 0 100 1.76 10.18 271
FDI 0 0 100 33.03 44.59 32
P G 0 0 100 10.57 28.11 81
P 0 0 100 8.53 24.13 371
911
*Share of main Market (1) export   supplier
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 10 80 32.18 32.77 17
FDI G 0 1 100 18.00 33.84 10
P 0 1 100 35.19 44.74 31
FDI 0 0 100 10.74 26.11 23
G G 0 0 100 6.85 20.75 68
P 0 0 100 10.58 28.64 65
FDI 0 0 80 1.93 10.48 111
P G 0 0 100 5.45 20.40 259
P 0 0 100 9.77 25.03 277
861
*marketing site (2)  home city inside  with customer
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 25 80 24.13 21.35 23
FDI G 0 60 100 58.57 39.68 23
P 0 20 100 35.24 36.13 38
FDI 0 10 100 29.30 32.49 20
G G 0 50 100 50.04 34.08 91
P 0 30 100 41.31 35.47 319
FDI 0 15 100 27.11 36.76 35
P G 0 50 100 49.10 37.99 93
P 0 40 100 43.86 34.13 420
1039
*Marketing site (2)  City inside   with supplier
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 12.5 50 17.05 16.12 20
FDI G 0 15 100 25.14 26.68 14
P 0 25 100 34.90 37.48 31
FDI 0 50 100 50.00 36.24 27
G G 0 30 100 42.80 35.51 83
P 0 60 100 56.39 37.52 85
FDI 0 40 100 44.98 33.31 126
P G 0 40 100 44.18 35.49 285
P 0 30 100 40.08 35.13 332
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 Appendix 3  Competitiveness and bargaining power                    
 
 
*Competitiveness of goods   if the good is unique==1, if the good is commodity==0
*Total 
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 1 1 0.59 0.50 22
FDI G 0 1 1 0.59 0.50 22
P 0 1 1 0.56 0.50 36
FDI 0 0 1 0.42 0.51 19
G G 0 1 1 0.51 0.50 92
P 0 1 1 0.50 0.50 311
FDI 0 0 1 0.44 0.50 41
P G 0 0 1 0.21 0.41 92
P 0 0 1 0.29 0.45 421
1056
*Share of the products in  the supplier's input
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 10 35 100 50.93 34.45 20
FDI G 5 25 100 34.00 28.19 12
P 3 20 90 28.81 23.90 29
FDI 2 30 95 37.96 22.12 24
G G 2 40 100 45.67 27.60 77
P 3 30 80 34.42 22.58 77
FDI 2 30 100 37.75 26.20 119
P G 1 30 190 39.69 29.22 258
P 0 30 100 37.83 27.23 290
906
*Rivarly  if no rival==0, one rivals==1, a few rivalry   with customer
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 2 3 1.90 0.89 21
FDI G 0 2.5 3 1.86 1.36 22
P 0 3 3 2.28 1.03 36
FDI 0 2 3 1.78 0.94 18
G G 0 2 3 2.02 1.01 92
P 0 2 3 2.19 0.81 318
FDI 0 2 3 2.08 0.73 40
P G 0 3 3 2.38 0.97 92
P 0 3 3 2.35 0.86 413
1052
* Do you have potential substitute supplier? Yes=-1 No==0   with supplier
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 1 1 0.75 0.44 20
FDI G 0 1 1 0.86 0.36 14
P 0 1 1 0.82 0.39 33
FDI 0 1 1 0.74 0.45 27
G G 0 1 1 0.81 0.39 79
P 0 1 1 0.84 0.37 85
FDI 0 1 1 0.75 0.44 122
P G 0 1 1 0.85 0.36 276
P 0 1 1 0.91 0.29 336
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Appendix 4  Default experiences and ex post management  
         
*no default experience in between 1999 to 2003
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 1 1 0.61 0.50 23
FDI G 0 0 1 0.17 0.39 23
P 0 0 1 0.32 0.47 38
FDI 0 0 1 0.26 0.45 19
G G 0 0 1 0.38 0.49 93
P 0 0 1 0.35 0.48 319
FDI 0 1 1 0.51 0.51 39
P G 0 0 1 0.43 0.50 93
P 0 0 1 0.36 0.48 425
*being completely defaulted 
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 0 1 0.13 0.34 23
FDI G 0 0 1 0.26 0.45 23
P 0 0 1 0.29 0.46 38
FDI 0 0 1 0.37 0.50 19
G G 0 0 1 0.30 0.46 93
P 0 0 1 0.29 0.45 318
FDI 0 0 1 0.13 0.34 39
P G 0 0 1 0.30 0.46 93
P 0 0 1 0.27 0.45 424
1070
*When default happens, stopped transaction
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 0 1 0.44 0.53 9
FDI G 0 1 1 0.58 0.51 19
P 0 0 1 0.43 0.50 28
FDI 0 0 1 0.14 0.36 14
G G 0 0 1 0.46 0.50 61
P 0 0 1 0.32 0.47 214
FDI 0 0 1 0.39 0.50 23
P G 0 0 1 0.47 0.50 58
P 0 0 1 0.43 0.50 289
715
*When default happens, suited
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max mean s.d. n
FDI 0 0 1 0.33 0.50 9
FDI G 0 0 1 0.26 0.45 19
P 0 0 1 0.14 0.36 28
FDI 0 0 1 0.29 0.47 14
G G 0 0 1 0.30 0.46 61
P 0 0 1 0.28 0.45 214
FDI 0 0 1 0.30 0.47 23
P G 0 0 1 0.28 0.45 58
P 0 0 1 0.25 0.44 289
(Source) JICA PBOC survey
